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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Comments on USIB-D-34.4/4,
27 December 1962

1. This draft is considerably improved over the earlier version which went to the U. S. Intelligence Board on 15 August 1962. However, some parts of the report call for further comment as outlined below. The comment has been developed in coordination with appropriate Agency components.

2. The report, in paragraph 4i of Attachment B, touches on measures to supervise the activities of major military technical intelligence components outside the organizational framework of the DOD intelligence agencies and of USIB. I refer specifically to Foreign Technology Division of the Air Force Systems Command and the Foreign Science and Technology Center of the Army Materiel Command. We would like to stress that these activities must receive adequate supervision and guidance from DIA so as to ensure receipt by the DOD research and development components

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of intelligence views which are consistent with national intelligence positions.

3. I feel rather strongly that CIA's obligations to support research and development components of the DOD and AEC should not be terminated or abridged in any way. Paragraph 4j of the paper implies that such support would no longer be required.

4. Recommendation 5b, as in the earlier draft, continues to call for re-examination by CIA, in consultation with DIA, of its programs and activities for the production of scientific and technical intelligence. It should be noted that the DIA has not yet settled on a plan for the conduct of scientific intelligence analysis and it is unlikely that a component for this purpose will be ready to start functioning when the DIA activates its Production Center on 1 February 1963. Thus, there is as yet no DOD authority with which we can coordinate our production plans. This same recommendation calls upon the Scientific Intelligence Committee to use its offices to facilitate coordination. It would seem more appropriate to call upon all USIB Committees in the scientific and technical intelligence field to exercise this function.

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5. In my opinion, the report still fails to treat fully another principal problem in S&T intelligence today--a general scarcity of fully competent scientific intelligence analysts. The problem is becoming increasingly acute in the light of increased emphasis on technical collection systems bringing in huge quantities of data of variable quality and consuming a disproportionate share of intelligence funds and manpower.

6. Paragraph 4e, concerning issuance of coordinated guidance manuals to field collectors, appears to treat only one aspect of the broader and more complex problem of collection requirements and related support materials designed for the most appropriate collector. In so doing, it treats the guidance problem out of context and diverts the planner's attention from the sequence that collection support actions normally must follow in order to be effective. It would appear more appropriate for the DIA and CIA to investigate development of a program under which (1) consumers first identify their collection needs in joint or separate statements as appropriate; (2) collection needs are matched against capabilities of individual collectors; and (3) requirements

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and other collection support materials, including guidance manuals, are then developed to fit the operational characteristics of each collector. Without this sort of orderly overall approach, field collectors will again be inundated as they have been in the past with indiscriminate guidance materials that either stimulate duplicatory and wasteful collection or task the collector completely out of accord with any capability that he has or can develop. Part of this sequence of steps to improve guidance to field collection appears to be provided for in paragraph 4f.

7. The Clandestine Services have asked that certain statements in the report concerning their activities be modified along the following lines:

a. The DD/P has already taken necessary decisions as recommended in subparagraphs a, b and c, page 9, Attachment C. Details of the program of which these decisions are a part will be made available, if required, at the discussions scheduled with the DCI on this subject for the morning of 9 January.

b. The final sentence of paragraph 4f, Attachment B, should be deleted. The proposed inventory of intelligence activities would prejudice secure clandestine operations and does not promise to assist effective servicing of Defense requirements.

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c. The Clandestine Services are now aggressively seeking out and developing new opportunities for defection, in accordance with past studies made by the Interagency Defector Committee. Renewed studies by the IDC, therefore, do not appear to be justified at this time. (See Par. 5c, Attachment B, and last paragraph, page 10, Attachment C.)

d. Concerning Attachment C, top of page 10, the Clandestine Services are now exploring the possibility of obtaining [REDACTED] for cover purposes as well as other means of making use of normal operations of the [REDACTED] 25X1C4a

8. I believe that these points should be a part of USIB discussion of the subject report and that some modification of it is appropriate in the light of them.

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RAY S. CLINE
Deputy Director/Intelligence

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Remarks: <p>This memorandum has been coordinated with FI/SIG, OC/FDD, OO/Sovmat Staff, OO/Lincoln Staff, OCR/Staff Requirements Coordinator, ORR/Mr. Proctor, DDR/ [REDACTED]</p> <p>Under Para. 7 Mr. Proctor suggested that another statement be included to cover the development of collection capabilities where no capability now exists and the feed-back of intelligence analysis on requirements. Although we agree with these comments, they were not included because of lack of time.</p>					
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